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As the world becomes more globalized, the tangible lines dividing countries and cultures 
are increasingly blurred. The inter-connectedness of the globe brings people thousands of miles 
away from each other together in a matter of seconds. However, as globalization has proliferated, 
other theories of dividing the world have arisen.  One of the most popular—some may argue it is 
the most popular—theories of dividing up the world was published in 1993 in Foreign Affairs by 
Samuel Huntington.  Originally titled “Clash of Civilizations?”—later on the question mark was 
removed when the thesis was expounded upon and made into a book—Huntington attempted to 
provide readers with a new term that described a long-standing, internalized political myth: “The 
idea of a Clash between Civilizations is a sort of electric spark that sets people’s imagination 
alight, because it finds fertile soil in which to proliferate” (Bottici & Challand, 2010, p. 2).   The 
popularity behind this essay and book can partly be attributed to its timing.  The Soviet Union 
had collapsed just two years before, and the public, as well as policy makers, were having 
difficulty in making sense of the new unipolar/multipolar world. Huntington provided a frame to 
help make sense of the world.1 In other words, this book had a large influence on those in 
political power as well as the general public, providing a very particular lens for Western society 
at large to look through.  My assertion is that the American media adopted the ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ theory in its framing of Muslims and Islam after September 11.  Although, as 
mentioned above, this idea itself was not at all new to intellectual discourse when Huntington 
introduced it, in order to fully understand the notion it is necessary to recall its history.  
 
                                                          
1. It should be made clear that I am in no way vouching for Huntington’s interpretation of the world.  As I 
will touch on later, I very much disagree with his reductionist stance of interpreting the world.  His 
framework provided a name to an idea that had been prevalent a long time before Huntington.  For more 
on framing’s effect on thought process, see Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction (Flood 1996) . 
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History 
The idea of the Clash of Civilizations has been held within many different societies 
dating far back in history.  To this day there is much argument about the actual genesis of the 
idea of the Clash of Civilizations—whether it began as far back as the Crusades, or with the 
colonization of the Iberian Peninsula, etc. —however, that argument is irrelevant to my research.  
I will briefly review the literature of the European colonization of Eastern countries, for that is 
the same time period when the concept of Orientalism came to fruition.  In postcolonial studies 
there is an idea called “colonial discourse” which functions as the main purpose of Orientalism. 
Doris Garraway gives an excellent summary of this idea: “In the work of Edward Said, Gayatri 
Spivak, and Homi Bhabha, ‘colonial discourse’ has been described as the epistemological 
corollary to colonial violence, a system of knowledge and representation through which 
Europeans produced, defined, and contained non-European difference and, in the process 
developed ideological justifications of colonialism” (Garraway; 209).2 In the same paragraph 
Garraway continues, “This discursive apparatus of power is said to have relied in many instances 
on a structure of binary opposition that posited the racial, cultural, and linguistic inferiority of the 
colonized as compared with the Europeans” (Garraway 209).  The Clash of Civilizations theory 
also imitates this concept, and once again in a more agile fashion than in colonial times.  There is 
a dialectical relationship between the West and Islam that is implied by Huntington throughout 
his book.  Early on he even addresses this dialectic: “We know who we are only when we know 
who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against” (Huntington, 2003, p. 21).  
                                                          
2. Although it is too farfetched to say that it is advertently mimicked, Huntington’s claim “to promote 
Western political values and institutions by pressing other societies to respect human rights as conceived 
in the West and adopt democracy on Western lines” does fall in the same vein as ‘colonial discourse;’ it is 
just a more refined argument using the idea of promoting values rather than imposing them upon a 
certain people. 
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In other words, the negative creates the positive, and vice versa.  To say that the West is 
‘democratic,’ ‘liberal,’ and ‘free,’ then placing the Islamic world as something opposed to the 
West, implies the idea that the Islamic world is non-democratic and backward.3  From here, as 
mentioned above by Garraway, the campaign calls for involvement in the Islamic world however 
the West sees fit.  The West is the pinnacle of civilization, so it must naturally help the other 
‘lesser’ civilizations modernize.  This concept of the West as the apex of the world is central in 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order and Huntington’s view of the world can 
partly be attributed to Francis Fukuyama’s End of History thesis.  Huntington built Clash of 
Civilizations off of the model established by Fukuyama.  And in order to fully understand the 
West as the ‘best’ it is necessary to review the main argument of The End of History before 
beginning my analysis of Huntington’s work.   
End of History Analysis 
In the introduction of his book The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama 
summarizes the thesis he expounds upon in the End of History section of his book.  He writes, “I 
argued that liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ 
and the ‘final form of human government,’ and such constituted the ‘end of history” (Fukuyama, 
1989, p. 1).  This is of course a variation from the Marxist historical interpretation of global 
economic systems eventually culminating in the creation of a worldwide communist society.  
Fukuyama’s linear impression of governmental bodies posits all other current and former 
governmental bodies behind the ideal of liberal democracy.  He writes: “While some present-day 
countries might fail to achieve stable liberal democracy, and others might lapse back into other, 
                                                          
3.  “Islamic culture explains in large par the failure of democracy to emerge in much of the Muslim world” 
(Huntington, 1996, p. 29); also see: 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/10/1021_031021_islamicdemocracy.html 
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more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship, the ideal of liberal 
democracy could not be improved on” (Fukuyama, 1989, p.1).  It is from this idea that 
Huntington builds his Clash of Civilizations theory.  One should refer to the notion mentioned by 
Huntington that I reference later on in my argument, “the West and the rest,” for it embodies 
Fukuyama’s argument.  If one sees the world divided between ‘the West’ and everything else 
(Huntington 1996, p. 22) the immediate thought that comes to mind is ‘the West’ holding power 
over ‘the rest.’  Again the dialectical relationship emerges with Fukuyama’s claim: Liberal 
democracy is the end, the best, and so it becomes the thesis.  All other governments become the 
antithesis.  In this case, the West can either remain uninvolved in the other ‘lesser’ governments, 
allowing them to eventually become liberal democracies like the West; or, supported by 
Fukuyama’s comment about governments “[lapsing] back into other, more primitive forms of 
rule,” the West could take aggressive action in an effort to contain the threat or possibly force the 
government into a democracy. It is from this point that I will begin my analysis of Huntington’s 
argument for the Clash of Civilizations.  
Clash of Civilizations Analysis 
 Huntington’s book is divided into five parts, which are centered on the idea that “culture 
and cultural identities…are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the 
post-Cold War world” (Huntington, 1996, p. 20).  These five parts are: 1) An assessment of a 
multipolar and multicivilizational world; 2) The shifting balance of power among ‘civilizations’; 
3) “A Civilization-based world order is emerging” (1996, p. 20); 4) “The West’s universalist 
pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam 
and China” (1996, p. 20); 5) “ The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their 
Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting 
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to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies” (Huntington, 1996, p. 
20-1, italics mine).  In my research, close attention will be paid to Parts 4 and 5, for they are 
extremely volatile assertions when incorporated into the political realm, specifically foreign 
policy.  I will come back to this issue later on in this paper, as it is very important to the core 
argument in my research.  Subsequent to Huntington’s mentioning of the five parts of his 
argument, he establishes his nine ‘civilizations’ of the world.  The ‘civilizations’ are listed as 
follows: “Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and 
Japanese” (Huntington, 1996, p. 27).  Huntington pays close attention to, as mentioned in part 4, 
‘Islam’ and ‘Confucian’ civilizations.  The manner in which attention is paid to Islam in 
particular takes up an Orientalist position. The concept of “knowing” the Orient is displayed in 
Huntington’s assessment of Islam.  It is the classic example of the West interpreting the East in a 
way that supports the West’s endeavors.4  
In evaluating different civilizations’ viability for democracy in the early stages of his 
argument, Huntington pays close attention to Islam.  At one point he writes, “Islamic culture 
explains in large part the failure of democracy to emerge in much of the Muslim world” 
(Huntington 1996; 29), a point that he fails to elaborate upon.  Huntington makes a sweeping 
generalization of the Orient without any support and then, unexpectedly, goes on to praise 
Edward Said’s work, Orientalism.  Regarding Said’s work Huntington says, “These myths 
[Unity of the non-West, as well as the East-West dichotomy] suffer the defects of the 
Orientalism which Edward Said appropriately criticized for promoting ‘the difference between 
                                                          
4.  Said provides an excellent example of this concept when he discusses Henry Kissinger’s relationship to the 
traditional Orientalist; he writes, “Both the traditional Orientalist, as we shall see, and Kissinger conceive of 
the difference between cultures, first, as creating a battlefront that separates them, and second, as inviting 
the West to control, contain and otherwise govern (through superior knowledge and accommodating power) 
the Other” (Said, 2003, p. 48) 
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the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’) and for 
assuming the inherent superiority of the former to the latter” (Huntington, 1996, p. 33).  As 
mentioned above, the generalization of ‘Islamic culture’ attests to the idea of Orientalism, yet 
Huntington explicitly denounces the idea while implicitly supporting it.5 
In my final word about the introduction of Clash of Civilizations, Huntington attempts to 
change the popular conception of the East-West dichotomy, which ends up just adding to the 
problem.  He argues, “Instead of ‘East and West,’ it is more appropriate to speak of ‘the West 
and the rest,’ which at least implies the existence of many non-Wests.  The world is too complex 
to be usefully envisioned for most purposes as simply divided economically between North and 
South or culturally between East and West” (Huntington, 1996, p. 33).  The first and most 
glaring issue with this passage is the ethnocentrism “the West and the rest” implies. This phrase 
places the importance on the West while lumping every other country in the world together.  
Huntington, with this phrase, practices an Orientalist tactic of using ‘the West’ as a pinnacle of 
civilization.6 He is able to guard against any potential accusations of being called an Orientalist 
by referencing Edward Said earlier on in the book. Huntington’s use of denying that which he 
textually follows through with is what I will call explicit-denunciation—implicit-support.  This is 
a tactic that is used often in policy rhetoric as well as media coverage, and it is a methodology I 
will cover later on in my argument. In Part IV of Clash of Civilizations, Huntington makes two 
points which should be mentioned before concluding this analysis of his argument.  The first is 
this: “Islam and China embody great cultural traditions very different from and in their eyes 
                                                          
5. This same type of linguistic gymnastics was used after September 11th, first by President Bush in his reiteration 
‘This is not a war with Islam,’ followed by the media adopting the same characteristics of explicit-denunciation 
implicit-support. For example, “Barbarians at the gate,” and “The one true faith.”   
6. See Orientalism, pages, 222-224 278-289, and 308-309. For example, “Orientalism staked its existence, not 
upon its openness, its receptivity to the Orient, but rather on its internal, repetitious consistency about its 
constitutive will-to-power over the Orient.”  Also, “the Orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of 
Western power as it attempted policy vis-à-vis the Orient.” 
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infinitely superior to that of the West” (Huntington, 2003, p.185).  Huntington’s statement here 
displays, once again, his Orientalist stance of ‘knowing’ the Orient and how ‘they’ perceive the 
world; in particular, how ‘they’ perceive ‘us’.  This distinction of Islam and China against the 
West is an idea that helps to construct a new enemy of the United States.  However, 
Huntington’s argument focuses on Islam, using China almost as a guarding term against 
criticism.7 Following this passage, Huntington presents his three issues within Islamic and 
Confucian societies that the West must become more involved in: “(1) to maintain its military 
superiority through policies of nonproliferation and counterproliferation with respect to nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them; (2) to promote Western 
political values and institutions by pressing other societies to respect human rights as conceived 
in the West and adopt democracy on Western lines; and (3) to protect the cultural, social, and 
ethnic integrity of Western societies by restricting the number of non-Westerners admitted as 
immigrants or refugees” (Huntington, 1996, 185-6).8  The first clause in this section calls for the 
efforts of US policy makers to maintain a unipolar military dominance in (of) the world—this is 
an important point because many people in the US at this time were having difficulty in figuring 
out what the new world would look like with the fall of the Soviet Union.  Beginning around the 
time this book was written, up until today, the US has focused heavily on the nuclear, chemical, 
and biological proliferation in countries, particularly in the ‘Muslim world’—i.e. Syria, Iraq, and 
Iran.   The second clause, which initially may seem as though it is altruistic and humanitarian, 
                                                          
7. He focuses on fundamentalism and the rise of an anti-Western trend in Muslim countries since 1970s. 
Guarding is used in reference to logic: defending one’s claim by adding an additional clause or concept, to 
prevent the argument from being seen as too aggressive. 
8. These three issues that Huntington claims the West should become more involved in were  adopted as some 
of the main argumentative points in the mainstream American media’s framing of the Afghanistan and Iraq 
wars.  For example, see Time magazine’s issues “Life After Saddam,” “Do You Want This War?” and Time’s 
Special Winter Edition 
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when used by radical policy makers can call for a Machiavellian-type of promotion of Western 
values.  It also implies a certain ethnocentrism, claiming, ‘Our values and institutions in the West 
are the best,’ which in turn denounces all other civilizations’ values and institutions—this idea 
refers back to Fukuyama’s End of History.  A particular instance of this clause is adopted and 
carried out in the Bush administration’s use of the figure of the Afghan woman—depicted as 
marginalized, oppressed, and weak under the rule of the Taliban—in an effort to garner support 
for the Afghanistan war.  The third clause, though it focuses on immigrants and refugees, alludes 
to the ideal American who fits a particular cultural, social, and ethnic frame.  Thus, this allusion 
moves those who are American citizens but do not fit the ideal model to the periphery of society.  
In other words, those who happen to be part of the West but do not fit the mold are not ‘fully part 
of the West.’   
In conclusion, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations theory provided policy makers and 
laypeople with a more definitive model of a long-standing political myth through which to 
perceive the post-Soviet world. This theory’s popularity can be attributed to its timing rather than 
its argument.   As mentioned earlier, many Americans—policy makers and laypeople alike—
were having difficulty interpreting the new post-Soviet world.   Initially, the essay and the book 
were denounced, as noted by Bottici and Challand: “Immediately after publication, his ideas 
were strongly criticized, if not simply dismissed as scientifically inadequate to render the 
complexities of the world we live in” (p. 2).  Despite the many criticisms, Huntington was able to 
plant a seed in the collective mind of American policy makers and journalists that blossomed on 
September 11 with the attacks in New York City and Washington D.C.  The mainstream media 
framed the assaults almost immediately as an attack on the West by Islam, a frame which 
emulated the view of many policy makers in the George W. Bush administration’s view of the 
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crisis.9  This project is a systematic analysis of four mainstream print media sources—New York 
Times, Wall Street Journal, Time, and USA Today—from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 
2001.  I argue that, in varying degrees, the media collectively adopted a framework of the Clash 
of Civilizations in its representation of Muslims and Islam, which in turn supported the 
aggressive military endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Methodology 
I designed a methodology that proved very effective in my analysis of media sources 
from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2001.  I examined the Tuesday paper each week in all 
four of my sources. I chose the Tuesday of every week to assist the systematizing of my 
research.  The attacks happened on a Tuesday, and many of the mainstream papers ran articles 
specifically on the ‘anniversaries’ of the attacks in subsequent weeks.  Additionally, because my 
media analysis was, in some respects, a comparative study, the material between sources was 
easier to compare.  Fortunately, I was able to find many different books that provided a similar 
analysis as mine.  Due to this, I benefitted from in-depth coverage and interpretation of some 
articles that were not available because of my date-specific analysis.    The lack of time available 
for analysis due to my short summer research program was another added liability when it came 
to my in-depth research.  Given more time I would have been able to examine more articles and 
literature, and it is also something that I will take into account when I add to this project in the 
future.  In my media analysis, I looked for explicit statements and implicit allusions to the Clash 
of Civilizations.  Among the explicit statements I searched for are: a ‘clash’ between Islam 
[Muslim world] and the West; ‘Islam vs. the West; descriptions of the Middle East as backward, 
archaic, pre-modern, barbaric; Manichean dualism—in other words, good vs. evil; and 
                                                          
9. For example, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Bernard Lewis, and Francis Fukuyama. 
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descriptions of the West, particularly the US, as the pinnacle of civilization— which 
demonstrates the dialectical relationship between the West and Islam.  The implicit allusions 
were more difficult to find for they needed to be discovered contextually rather than 
superficially.   Some examples of these are: the coverage of the oppressed Afghan woman under 
the rule of the Taliban—this implies the need for a savior who is also someone civilized to 
liberate these women; the concept of ‘knowing’ why the enemy hates ‘us’ because of our values 
alludes to the concept of the Clash of Civilizations because they do not hold our same values, 
which in this case are implied to be ‘right’—it subordinates the enemy as weak-minded because 
they are easily understood, and it absolves the US of all responsibility for potentially instigating 
the actions of others.  After the data was collected I organized the evidence using a mixture of 
chronological and thematic order.  Initially, the first few weeks of reporting were important to be 
placed chronologically; however, once I noticed a shift in the reporting away from the attacks I 
switched to a more thematic assessment.  The aim of my research is to act as an extension to 
studies of media representation of Islam and Muslims, the Clash of Civilizations theory, and the 
media’s relationship to foreign policy.   
Literary Analysis 
Edward Said’s work, Covering Islam, greatly influenced my topic. It serves as a criticism 
of the mainstream media’s representation of Islam before the September 11 attacks.  Said had a 
great understanding of the media’s power and how it operates.  Covering Islam examines the 
mainstream media’s representation of the Iranian revolution in 1979 on television and in print, 
particularly the New York Times.  My project has a close relation to his, though it covers a 
different time frame and my topic is also more defined.  Said focuses on the way the media 
distorts its representation of Islam. Additionally he does not focus on a particular frame; instead 
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he focuses on an all-inclusive frame that the media operates within. In other words, Said in his 
research, looked on a large scale at print and visual media sources in the United States and 
examined its representation of Islam.   My project attempts to uncover a particular frame which 
will allow individuals to gain a better understanding of how the media frames foreign peoples 
and religions, especially when they are part of an area of American foreign interest. 
Another piece that heavily influenced my work is The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations 
by Chiara Bottici and Benoit Challand.  Their work helped me pinpoint my thesis, which 
diverges somewhat from theirs.  They write, “How was it possible, then, that a theory that had 
been so strongly criticized has turned into a lens through which so many people look at the 
world?...Our book argues that this is because the Clash of Civilizations has become a successful 
political myth.  The appeal of Huntington’s book lies in its title more than in its content” (Bottici 
& Challand 2).  In my analysis of Huntington’s book I covered his three issues with Islamic and 
Confucian civilizations, his use of explicit-denunciation—implicit-support and his all-around 
focus on Islamic civilizations juxtaposed with the West.  I disagree with the assertion that 
Huntington’s title is more appealing than the contents within the book.  To claim this reduces the 
framing of the Clash of Civilizations in the media to a three-word title, and it also avoids the 
potential influence of the contents of the book.  Granted, Bottici and Challand use the vague 
phrase “so many people,” but one can infer from the content of their book they are mainly 
referring to policy makers and the media.  In other words, they believe the title of Huntington’s 
work influenced the worldview of those in power more than its contents.  I want to argue that it 
is not this simple.  Making the claim that the name ‘Clash of Civilizations’ carries more weight 
than the contents of the theory creates two problems: 1) It overlooks the contents of the theory in 
comparison to political rhetoric and media coverage; and 2) It denounces the ability of the 
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contents of a political theory to influence media and policy.  I argue that the Clash of 
Civilizations theory was used in two frameworks by policy makers and the media in light of 
September 11: A large scale, geopolitical framework and a micro-political framework.  The 
geopolitical framework refers to the concept that Bottici and Challand argue for.  It is the 
adopting of the idea of clashing, isolated civilizations— and as I cover in my media analysis, the 
juxtaposition of the West and Islam.  The micro-political framework is the use of specific 
arguments from the book, such as “promoting Western political values and institutions by 
pressing other societies to respect human rights as conceived in the West” (Huntington, 1996, 
p.185).  I will be using the cascading activation model created by Robert Entman as a 
justification for both of the aforementioned frameworks. (Entman, 2004, p. 10)  This model 
explains how both the geopolitical and micro-political frameworks are used within the media.  
According to the model, the reciprocal relationship between the “Administration” and “Other 
Elites” explains how the Clash of Civilizations theory was adopted.  First, Samuel Huntington 
created the theory in 1996, explaining the longstanding idea that civilizations had been in 
conflict with each other for many years.  Though it was denounced and almost forgotten, the 
September 11 attacks—accompanied by the unrest in the Middle East, one could argue 
particularly the first Intifada between Israel and Palestine—enabled it to resurface, stronger than 
ever. Subsequent to September 11, the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World 
Order became an instant bestseller: so much so that by 2002, Netscape, an internet provider, was 
offering free copies (Abrahamian, 2003, p. 529).  Ervand Abrahamian, in discussing the 
proliferation of the Clash of Civilizations theory writes, “Paradigms do not have to be true to 
become conventional wisdom” (2003, p. 529). Simply by logically assessing the resurgence and 
exponential increase in sales of Huntington’s book one can come to the conclusion that in 
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moving from a theory that was mostly part of academia in the 1990s to becoming conventional 
wisdom within the public after September 11 some kind of arbiter is needed to bridge the gap.  
That bridge is the American media.  The idea of the media serving as an intermediary to the 
public is supported in the cascading activation model as well.  Before the information is relayed 
from the media to the public it goes through a framing process—the framing is also closely 
related to the “Other Elite” category, which would include Huntington as an “expert.” Also, 
because I will be adhering to the cascading activation model in my research of the media, if I do 
uncover rhetoric and reporting that resembles either framework I mentioned above, it gives all 
the more evidence that Clash of Civilization theory was used in the reporting of Muslims and 
Islam.  As I have mentioned, my assertion is that the portrayal of Muslims and Islam through the 
lens of the Clash of Civilizations was done so, partly, in support—and to garner support—of 
aggressive action in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In order to fully understand this use of 
representations and “knowing” the enemy abroad we must look towards colonial literature.  I 
will expound upon the history in the next section. 
Introduction 
One gets the feeling that, through the proliferation of technology, the ability to acquire 
information across the world in New York from Iran brings the two cultures and ‘worlds’ 
together.  It does, but only to a certain extent.  One of the main factors that inhibit this 
connection is the manner in which the media operates.  For most, the media is the main source of 
informational access to the rest of the world.  It has the ability to create a country’s 
interpretations of events, peoples, cultures, religions, and nations abroad. A news organization 
can, simply by writing negatively of an event occurring elsewhere in the world, for which 
readers have no other access than that particular news source, create an entire viewpoint from a 
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single article. From the concept of the free press—one that is often mentioned in the American 
political realm—the power of the media could act as a check on the government.  Robert Entman 
elaborates on this idea: “Ideally, a free press balances official view with a more impartial 
perspective that allows the public to deliberate independently on the government’s decisions” 
(Entman, 2004, p. 2).  The large-scale point of my research is to add to the concept that the press 
is not ‘free’ from influences and is instead molded and shaped by the political arena—
particularly policy makers and government officials.  Proving that the mainstream media 
adopted, in varying degrees, a Clash of Civilizations framework in its coverage of Muslims and 
Islam demonstrates the idea of understanding where information comes from before internalizing 
the said information as fact.  In other words, this project is founded on the principle of power-
knowledge.10  The often-used, conventional criticism of the media is the partisan framing, 
particularly done on news stations—the most criticized are Fox News and MSNBC.  However, 
what is often overlooked is the concept of a larger framework: the media functioning 
complementary or as a cohesive unit.  The concept of partisan framing is an obvious bias in 
reporting but it also limits the discussion.11  That is particularly why I chose the four particular 
sources for this project. The New York Times is arguably the most influential paper in the world, 
and more importantly for this study, in the United States.12 The paper’s bias is collectively more 
liberal, which gives rise to my reasoning for selecting the Wall Street Journal.  This paper 
                                                          
10. This concept is best studied in-depth from the works Discipline and Punish and The History of Madness both 
by Michel Foucault. Edward Said, however, gives an excellent summary of power-knowledge in Orientalism: 
knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable 
dialectic of information and control.” 
11. An example of the limiting effects of media on discussion can be found in two side-by-side articles in Time 
magazine regarding preemptive war in Iraq. See articles “Let’s Wait to Attack” and “No Let’s Not Waste Any 
Time” in the October 14, 2002 Time magazine. Between the two articles the arguments are ‘We should 
immediately go to war with Iraq’ and ‘we should hold off on the war.’  These two articles serve to frame the 
argument on potential war in Iraq into a minimized spectrum.  In other words, the arguments it fuels are going 
to war immediately or holding off for a certain period of time. 
12.  http://adage.com/article/datacenter/newspaper-circulation-6-mos-ending-9-30-02/106705/ The NYT, WSJ, 
and USA Today were the top three papers in circulation in 2001. 
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conversely is collectively more conservative, and is among the most read papers in the US, so an 
analysis of the WSJ and the NYT side-by-side gives both sides of the partisan story.  It also 
greatly helps my argument for the framing of the media because finding evidence in both papers 
proves the framing to be non-partisan. I chose Time due to the magazine’s different approach to 
reporting using pictures alongside text, as well as less technical language in reporting political 
events. In addition, Time essentially sits in the middle of the partisan spectrum and was a top 
magazine with political coverage from 2001-2003. 13 USA Today is considered ‘soft news,’ a 
term which means the reporting uses terminology and rhetoric more appealing to laypeople.  
Although it is not the newspaper upon which I will be focusing my analysis, I find it important to 
incorporate ‘soft news’ as it is an overlooked media outlet, and USA Today was the top 
newspaper in circulation during the time my research covers.14 I now begin my media analysis. 
Media Analysis 
Time magazine, like many other print media sources, ran a special on September 11.  
Many of its central themes were akin to the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal’s 
coverage of the events: A strong focus on nationalism and rallying around the flag, the immense 
sorrow felt by all Americans for those who lost their lives, and the lingering question of “what is 
next?”  However, one article stands out to be quite unlike the rest of the issue.  The kicker of the 
special edition is an article called “The Case for Rage and Retribution” by Lance Morrow.  
Lance Morrow is a journalist and an essayist that works mainly for Time magazine. He has been 
with Time since 1965, and has written more “Man of the Year” articles than any other writer in 
Time magazine’s history.  As mentioned in the essay’s title, Morrow attempts to make a logical 
                                                          
13.  http://adage.com/datacenter/datapopup.php?article_id=106627   
14. http://adage.com/article/datacenter/newspaper-circulation-6-mos-ending-9-30-01/106378/ 
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argument for rage among the American people.  Who we should use our rage towards is never 
specifically mentioned, although many of his statements are descriptive enough for one to 
formulate for his or herself who the enemy is that Morrow refers to.  He writes, “What’s needed 
is a unified, unifying, Pearl Harbor sort of purple American fury—a ruthless indignation that 
doesn’t leak away in a week or two…into a corruptly thoughtful relativism (as has happened in 
the recent past, when, for example, you might hear someone say, ‘Terrible what he did, of 
course, but, you know, the Unabomber does have a point, doesn’t he, about modern 
technology?” (Morrow, 2001). In other words, what Morrow argues in this statement is the idea 
of not logically assessing the attacks and rather just becoming angry at an enemy without a state 
that one cannot pick out of a crowd.  Applying this logic to the rest of the article creates in one’s 
understanding of who the true enemy is.  Morrow goes on to write, “Let America explore the 
rich reciprocal possibilities of the fatwa.  A policy of focused brutality does not come easily to a 
self-conscious, self-indulgent, contradictory, diverse, humane nation with a short attention span.”  
The wrongful use of the term fatwa15 in the aforementioned sentence misrepresents Islam and 
Muslims as ‘brutal’ and incorporates the geopolitical effect of the Clash of Civilizations theory.  
It differentiates Islam and the West, arguing that the West should take up the barbaric qualities of 
the Islamic world.  But Morrow does not stop here.  He continues, writing, “Anyone who does 
not loathe the people who did these things, and the people who cheer them on, is too 
philosophical for decent company.”  The use of ‘people’ here calls to mind an ethnic group or 
‘civilization’ of people cheering on crazed terrorists.16  Morrow concludes his article with this 
                                                          
15. From the Concise Encyclopedia of Islam: “A fatwa is a formal legal opinion given by a mufti or canon lawyer of 
standing, in answer to a question submitted to him either by a judge or by a private individual.  On the basis of 
such an ‘opinion’ a judge may decide a case, or an individual may regulate his personal life.” 
16. Another example of this method of referring to a large group of peoples—connected ethnically, religiously, 
etc.—is in the oft used phrase “Why Do They Hate Us?”  They in this question have a collective mind. Sources: 
The Big Terrible, Smoking or Non-Smoking NYT, WSJ: US steps up leaflets, Time: How Do They See Us Now? 
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statement: “The worst times, as we see, separate the civilized of the world from the uncivilized.  
This is the moment of clarity.  Let the civilized toughen up, and let the uncivilized take their 
chances in the game they started.” One should keep in mind, that this is the kicker of the kicker 
of one of the most important issues of Time ever.  In other words, it is the last statement that will 
be read by Americans on one of the most impressionable days of their lives.  Morrow adopts the 
idea of the Clash of Civilizations in this passage, although he just uses different terminology.  
The ‘civilized’ are the West; the ‘uncivilized,’ Islam.  One should note that ‘uncivilized’ does 
not refer to those on the fringe of the Islamic ‘civilization,’ but rather everyone who lives in the 
Islamic world.   Due to the importance of this issue of Time magazine and the positioning of this 
essay, it invokes a priming effect17 for its audience that associates the attacks with the dichotomy 
of the civilized and uncivilized, with Islam representing the uncivilized. The other mainstream 
print media outlets did not initially utilize the same coverage as Time magazine; the other 
sources that I analyzed took a more ambiguous route. 
 The New York Times’ initial coverage of Muslims and Islam after the terrorist attacks 
varied in each story.  On September 12 the Times ran an article about the anti-Arab and Muslim 
attacks all across the country.18  The article displayed some sympathy towards Muslims, 
referencing the profiling and internal aggression against Muslims after the Oklahoma City 
bombing.  In the same article, references are made about the controversial televised images of 
celebrating Palestinians.  David A. Harris of the American Jewish Commission is quoted as 
saying, “The fact that they are celebrating means they become our enemy.” This statement 
                                                          
17.  “Priming refers to the effect of some preceding stimulus or event on how we react, broadly defined, to some 
subsequent stimulus.  As applied to the media, priming refers to the effects of the content of the media on 
people’s later behavior or judgments related to the content that was processed.” In The SAGE Handbook of 
Media Processes and Effects by: Robin L. Nabi, Mary Beth Oliver, p. 14 
18.  In US, Echoes of Rift of Muslims and Jews; interestingly enough the article covered violence against Arabs as 
well, yet the title only contained Muslims, implying Muslims are Arabs. 
Thompson 18 
 
 
essentially puts into words what the many Americans felt when they saw the videos on the 
television.  The article, however, fails to provide any counter-point to Mr. Harris’ statement; 
instead, the author just moves on letting the volatile assertion resonate with the reader.  Within 
the same issue of the New York Times is an article entitled “Attackers Believed to Be Sane.”19 
One finds here the first kind of dialectical relationship that becomes more present in later 
coverage of Muslims and Islam in the mainstream media.  What the title implies is this: ‘We 
cannot label these men as crazed, barbaric religious fanatics, like the many other terrorists.’ The 
author goes on to describe some interviews with a few psychologists who have studied the 
psychology of terrorism. One quote in particular is interesting because it works against the 
concept of the Clash of Civilizations, especially when Islam is used as the root-cause to 
terrorism. The article quotes Dr. Harvey Kushner, a terrorism expert from Long Island 
University, who says, ''The person who does this [commits suicide in a bombing attack] does not 
see himself as giving up his life at a premature point. He sees it as for the greater good of society. 
And for us who try to guard against this, it's disastrous.''  Unlike some of the subsequent articles 
on terrorists out of the Middle East, this article includes a concept that goes against the grain.  In 
other words, those who attacked the United States did so, in their eyes, for the greater good of 
their society, rather than due to Islam.  Unfortunately, this counter-point is short-lived, as the 
very next point made by Dr. Vamik Volkan, an expert on inter-ethnic conflict out of the 
University of Virginia Medical School, who posits the societies of the suicide bombers 
[undoubtedly the Islamic world] back into their rightful barbaric, violence-loving place beneath 
                                                          
19.  Goode, E. (2001, Sep 12). Attackers believed to be sane, New York Times. 
Thompson 19 
 
 
that of the West: “Indeed, after their deaths, suicide bombers are often celebrated as heroes by 
their families and their communities.”20 
 In the same New York Times issue, in the article “America the Vulnerable Meets a 
Ruthless Enemy,”21 the author uses the same kind of rhetoric as a writer for the Wall Street 
Journal does two days later.  Burns writes, “On the tape, Mr. bin Laden read a chilling poem 
with themes that have a powerful resonance among Muslims with the grievances against 
America.” The subsequent article in the Wall Street Journal titled “Moving Target: Bin Laden’s 
Network, Far-Flung and Fanatic, Challenges Retaliation” reads, “Above all, the network’s [al 
Qaeda] ‘great strength is his [bin Laden] ability to pick up people, especially Muslims in 
Western countries at a loose end, looking for a cause,’ Mr. Randal says.”  Both of these articles 
employ the Orientalist concept of ‘knowing’ the Orient, which is in this case the Muslim.  The 
universalist language present in both articles—the former refers to all Muslims, while the latter 
refers to those only in Western countries—subordinates the Muslim into a more primitive, 
single-minded being.22  The root cause of Muslims joining al Qaeda, according to both of these 
articles, is the feeling of disenfranchisement and animosity towards the United States.23  What is 
constructed in both of these articles is the concept of the ‘bad’ Muslim.  The phrase ‘grievance 
against America’ is vague, putting any Muslim who criticizes an aspect of the United States in 
the ‘bad’ group.  In other words, the statement leaves the interpretation up to the reader.  The 
                                                          
20.  Ibid. 
21.  Burns, J. F. (2001, Sep 12). “America the vulnerable meets a ruthless enemy.” New York Times. 
22.  There are many examples of this concept displayed more explicitly in texts from previous years; for more see: 
The Roots of Muslim Rage by Bernard Lewis; or  Maxime Rodinson in Europe and the Mystique of Islam (1987)  
“The Oriental may always have been characterized as a savage enemy, but during the Middle Ages, he was at 
least considered on the same level as his European counterpart…In the nineteenth century, however, he 
became something quite separate, sealed off in his own specificity, yet worthy of a kind of grudging 
admiration.  This is the origin of the homo islamicus, a notion widely accepted even today.” 
23.  A concept the Francis Fukuyama argues for in his article in Slate, “Europe vs. Radical Islam”: 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2006/02/europe_vs_radical_islam.html. 
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Wall Street Journal article takes it a step further and says that al Qaeda is able to garner recruits 
from any Muslim who is ‘looking for a cause.’ This concept lumps all Muslims who are looking 
to become politically active in with potential terrorists. In addition to the sweeping 
generalizations both of these articles commit, they also create a ‘good’ Muslim to serve as the 
antithesis to the ‘bad.’  The ‘good’ Muslim is one who is not looking for a cause and lacks any 
‘grievance’ toward the United States because he or she supports the country.   Mahmood 
Mamdani also covers the idea of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslim using President Bush’s speech as 
an example of the normalizing:  
“The president seemed to assure Americans that ‘good Muslims’ were anxious to 
clear their names and consciences of this horrible crime and would undoubtedly 
support ‘us’ in a war against ‘them.’  But this could not hide the central message 
of such discourse: unless proved to be ‘good,’ every Muslim was presumed to be 
‘bad.’  All Muslims were now under obligation to prove their credentials by 
joining in a war against ‘bad’ Muslims.”24  
Subsequent articles in the New York Times also used this kind of distinction as well as 
incorporating the Orientalist tactic of ‘knowing.’  
 In Thomas Friedman’s article, “Smoking or Non-Smoking”, he writes,  
“These people [Muslim terrorists] think strategically. They also want to trigger 
the sort of massive U.S. retaliation that makes no distinction between them and 
other Muslims. That would be their ultimate victory -- because they do see the 
                                                          
24.  Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror by: Mahmood Mamdani, p. 15. 
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world as a clash of civilizations, and they want every Muslim to see it that way as 
well and to join their jihad.” 
He describes the attackers as ‘Muslim terrorists’ yet strangely denounces the idea of a Clash of 
Civilizations; Muslim becomes their defining characteristic.  Of all of my research this is the 
only instance which I found the phrase ‘Muslim terrorist’ used.  In the context of the article the 
phrase becomes more peculiar because Friedman blatantly says ‘they…see the world as a Clash 
of Civilizations.” However, the term Muslim as a defining term for terrorist creates an 
opposition.  Thus, Christian or Western or Jewish must be terminology for those that oppose the 
Muslim terrorist. Friedman adopts the abovementioned concept of explicit-denunciation—
implicit-support with his description. Coming from Thomas Friedman, this is important as he is 
one of the most popular and influential Op-Ed columnist of the Times.   Another instance of the 
concept of ‘knowing’ the ‘bad’ Muslim that adheres to the Clash of Civilizations theory comes 
from an unlikely source, King Abdullah of Jordan.    
 Some days later Friedman reported on an interview he had with King Abdullah.  
Following suit of his previous article he included a quote from the King of Jordan denouncing 
the terrorists in same way Friedman had.  Abdullah said,  
“They want to break down what America stands for. The terrorists actually want 
to provoke attacks on Arabs or Muslims in the U.S., because if the American 
communities start going after each other, if we see America fragment, then you 
destroy that special thing that America stands for.” 
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Once again the concept of knowing the Orient is used, this time however it is by the Orient—
which in turn also gives it more credibility.25  The Clash of Civilizations is what the terrorists 
want to create inside the United States.  This claim works in a way that implicitly supports the 
geopolitical aspect of the Clash of Civilizations theory.  If the United States wanted to defend 
against the terrorists, who were attempting to create a battle between those who would be 
considered a part of the Islamic world and the West, the terrorists would be deemed as Islam and 
the U.S. as the West.  It paradoxically becomes the West vs. Islam in defense of the West vs. 
Islam.  I will provide a short analysis of USA Today’s initial coverage of the attacks. 
 On September 13, an article was run that featured the opinions of many different 
demographics across the United States; “Muslims Share USA’s Sorrows in Attacks” was one of 
the headlines. It starts: “On behalf of the estimated 7 million American Muslims in this country, I 
want to condemn the vicious and cowardly acts that transpired Tuesday in our nation's capital 
and in New York City.”  The author of this piece pins the fault of the attacks on Muslims, just 
not those who are American. In other words, it supports the Clash of Civilizations so long as 
those who are persecuted are not American.  Additionally it follows the ‘good Muslim, bad 
Muslim’ paradigm mentioned by Mamdani.  Those who are ‘good’ must condemn the attacks in 
the same manner as the author of this article did.  Despite vouching for the ‘seven million 
American Muslims’ there is no way to differentiate who is ‘good’ simply by looking.  Therefore, 
this article reinforces the idea that all Muslims are ‘bad’ until proven to be ‘good.’ The same 
USA Today issue used similar vague language as mentioned above.  
                                                          
25. Banks’ Typology: King Abdullah is an Indigenous-Outsider, meaning, though he has adopted the values of an 
external community his opinion about his indigenous community still carries more weight than someone 
external like Friedman.  For a full review of the concept of Banks’ Typology see: Applying Banks' Typology of 
Ethnic Identity Development and Curriculum Goals to Story Content, Classroom Discussion, and the Ecology of 
Classroom and Community (1996) 
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 In “Bin Laden Hard to Find,” the terrorists in al Qaeda are referred to as ‘Militant 
Muslims.’ Just as Friedman does in “Smoking or Non-Smoking,” this article uses Muslim as the 
defining characteristic of the terrorist.  This insinuates Muslims, and Islam as a whole, being the 
root cause of the attacks.  In turn, this supports Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations theory, both 
micro-politically and geopolitically.  On the micro-political level, the defining characteristic of 
Muslim adheres to Huntington’s fourth clause of his book: “The West’s universalist pretensions 
increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China” 
(Huntington, 1996, p. 20).  The conflict stems from Islam because being Muslim is the defining 
characteristic of the terrorists.  In “Taliban May be the First Target of US Retaliation,” Jim 
Philips, a terrorist analyst of the Heritage Foundation, is quoted regarding bin Laden’s motives.  
He says, “bin Laden hates the United States because of our values…His terrorism is not meant to 
affect our polices as much as shake up our confidence… and help pave the way for the 
radicalization of the entire Muslim world.” Again the paradoxical notion of fighting Islam to 
prevent a larger Clash of Civilizations is brought up.  The fact that bin Laden ‘hates our values’ 
posits Islam against the West in the same fashion Huntington argued; specifically by ‘promoting 
Western values.’ After a few days of media coverage of the attacks it became a given that bin 
Laden was evil, which also meant his values were evil.  The thesis-antithesis relationship of him 
hating our values proves that our values are good.  If bin Laden wants to radicalize the Muslim 
world we must prevent him, for we are a force of good.  As a result, bin Laden hating our values 
invites our intervention. 26  
                                                          
26. This is similar to the point Said makes: “Both the traditional Orientalist, as we shall see, and Kissinger conceive 
of the difference between cultures, first, as creating a battlefront that separates them, and second, as inviting 
the West to control, contain, and otherwise govern (through superior knowledge and accommodating power) 
the Other” (Said, Orientalism, p. 48). 
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USA Today, in some of its initial coverage, included some articles making small attempts 
to its readers away from stereotyping.  One of the most common points brought up was the 
attacks and discrimination against Muslims and Arabs after the Oklahoma City bombing.   
Additionally, the paper allowed some Muslims to speak for themselves rather than allowing 
journalists to assess the conflict and backlash on their own merit.  However, as demonstrated 
above in “Muslims Share USA’s Sorrows in Attacks,” the Muslims that were printed in the paper 
were always ‘good:’ condemning the attacks and those that cheered them on, showing a large 
amount of nationalism, and supporting the United States’ subsequent military action  in response.  
As the weeks progressed, a new paradigm was set incorporated into the coverage of Muslims and 
Islam: The backward, barbaric Middle East.  
 The structure of the New York Times’ article, “Who Hates the U.S.? Who Loves It?” is 
built on the Clash of Civilizations theory.  It starts, “There are barbarians out there who hate 
America;” the term ‘barbarians’ in this instance essentially means a lack of modernity.  The 
article continues with a quote from President Bush, “Their leaders are self-appointed.  They hate 
our freedoms, our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to votes and 
assemble and disagree with each other.”  The president here commits a self-sealing fallacy, as 
there is no possible way to prove why ‘they’ hate ‘us.’  All that is accomplished from this quote 
is the creation of a juxtaposition between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and a denouncing of ‘them’ as a 
cohesive unit incapable of thinking individually.  In other words, it is wartime rhetoric, not 
cultural theory.  The editorial continues down the same road, peppering phrases like “yearnings 
for freedom,” “there is very little democracy in the Arabic-speaking and Muslims lands,” and the 
term “Westoxication” from 1960 Iran into the mix.  I found this article to be very important in 
the context of the NYT’s coverage of the attacks and Islam due to its argumentative style.  About 
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mid-way through the text the author addresses potential counter-arguments as to why ‘they’ hate 
‘us.’  One of these counter-arguments is: “No, they [Saudi consultative body] replied; the real 
motivations for the Sept. 11 attack were Israel and sanctions against Iraq.” The author wastes no 
time in shutting down this argument with a quote from an unnamed American official, “It was 
clear they were trying to deflect the issue.  It was a classic case of looking for the outside 
problem.”  This is the first instance in which I found a counter-argument to the Clash of 
Civilizations paradigm used by the mainstream print media.  Meaning, this was potentially the 
first instance a critical stance of the United States’ policies was addressed; however in the 
context of the article it is immediately dismissed.  Subsequently, the author shifts gears and 
begins to discuss Iranian and American economic relations.  Islam vs. the West is the 
overarching theme of the last half of the article.  From “American CD’s, videos, and computer 
programs are pirated and sold on the streets Tehran” to “Clerics in Qom have a sophisticated 
Islamic computer center where Koranic teaching and interpretations are on the Internet”—the 
Internet is labeled as one of America’s most secular achievements—Islam in Iran is seen as 
separate from the modernity in the United States.   The Wall Street Journal also began using a 
more critical tone when referring to Muslims and Islam a few weeks after the attacks, as well as 
covering more aggression against American Muslims. 
An article published on October 2, 2001 discussed an issue between a welder and his 
employer (Shirouzu, 2001). The employer is quoted calling Islam “the scum of the earth,” and 
that Islam “breeds terrorism.”  In the same issue a ‘Muslim melting pot’ is said to be the culture 
in Afghanistan, this is of course opposed to the idea of the United States being a melting pot for 
all cultures (Pope, 2001). (“For its Ferocity, Taliban Could Prove Easy Foe to Oust” Oct.1) The 
same article uses a curious quote by a Taliban leader, “The Muslim world is focusing on 
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Afghanistan for spiritual strength and the love of independence.”  This emulates some of the 
rhetoric of the later coverage of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, but within the American press.  
This quote is only used in passing but it raises a point about war-time rhetoric and the question of 
why the Wall Street Journal would include a quote that could undermine the war effort.  This is 
one of the only instances I found in my research of the journalist allowing the terrorist to speak 
for him or herself.   
It was also around this time that a large shift in the representation of Muslims and Islam 
in the mainstream media took place.  Chris Vecsey, whose book, Following 9/11, analyzes the 
religious coverage in the New York Times, writes about this shift:  
“By the second week of October the Times made for a more bellicose trope 
regarding Islam, employing ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric through columnists, 
pundits, and reporters.  It engaged in the ambiguity of defining American religion, 
with its Muslims more or less included, while contrasting the faith, the values, the 
sacralized institutions of the American way of life to those of an enemy identified 
with the Islamic religion” (2011, p.98). 
Two important political events coincided with this shift in coverage: 1) The bombing of 
Afghanistan began and 2) the first video of bin Laden was broadcast on national television.  In 
the Time magazine special seven countries in the Middle East were summarized in brief excerpts 
across three pages.  In the summaries there are three statistics: the population, the percent of the 
country that is Muslim, and the per capita GDP.  This implies that Islam is one of the most 
important factors in a country’s demographics; although it fails to cover the fact that the Middle 
East is only home to about twenty percent of worldwide Muslims.  Later on in the same 
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magazine, “The Taliban Troubles,” a report done regarding the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan, 
employs more blatant Clash of Civilizations rhetoric, using the geopolitical framework.  It starts, 
“In a bleak fortified compound few non-Muslims have ever seen sat a man few non-Muslims 
have ever met mulling over the future of a wanted man” (Mcgeary, 2001).  Once again, a 
dichotomy is drawn between who is and who is not a Muslim; it is the defining characteristic.  
About midway through the text the geopolitical framework becomes more apparent: “If he 
[Mullah Mohammad Omar] delivers bin Laden to the West, he betrays the man who helped bring 
him to power and sustains his rule now” (2001). Just as Huntington used ‘the West’ to disguise 
his actual reference to the United States, so too does this author. It is as though bin Laden had his 
hand in attacking all of’ the West’, as opposed to just the United States—this invokes the idea of 
the larger scale ‘clash.’  
In the New York Times, many articles that covered Muslims or Islam did in fact use much 
more blatant Clash of Civilizations rhetoric.  For example, the title “Bin Laden Images 
Mesmerize Muslims” treats the 1.2 billion people in the world as drone-like, singular figure who 
is overly-captivated by bin Laden’s speech (Sachs, 2001).   Within this article comes the 
statement, “Mr. bin Laden impressed many Muslims with these simple phrases.” The simple-
minded Muslims found bin Laden’s simple phrases captivating according to this article.  
Backwardness and the pre-modern Islamic world are two concepts produced by this rhetoric, 
demonstrating how unlike ‘we’ are from ‘them.’ 
The same day the Wall Street Journal ran a story titled “U.S. Retaliation Draws Little 
Muslim Objection.” What the title explicitly says is that there was an expected backlash from 
Muslims, although there is no specified region where these Muslims are from.  ‘Muslims’ from 
anywhere were expected to be angry over the bombing of Afghanistan, thinking and feeling as a 
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singular entity.  This of course references the Clash of Civilizations, treating the religion as the 
most important aspect, as well as the expectation of a clash.  Additionally, in the article the 
author uses the terms ‘Arab world’ and ‘Muslim world’ to describe the Middle East.  In other 
words, Arab and Muslim happen to be synonymous, impressing upon the reader the same kind of 
viewpoint.  This perpetuation of this common misconception in American society doubtlessly 
helped fuel the attacks on any who ‘looked Middle Eastern’ subsequent to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11. Following this article comes “Fight Plan,” which quotes angry demonstrators 
screaming, “Jihad! Jihad! America is the great Satan.” Of all my research this is the only instance 
in which I found the direct quotation of a crowd demonstration.  To quote a chant paints a picture 
of a huge crowd banded together against a cause, which in this case happens to be the United 
States.  An issue with this kind of reporting is its subjectivity.  With visuals, although an image 
can be skewed, it can only be done to certain extent.  If the reader has developed a strong dislike 
for Muslims he or she may read this as the genesis of the Clash of Civilizations, whereas 
someone else may read it as just a small group of angry people. The latter is much more feasible 
for the collective interpretation of this article due to the amount of priming the attacks in the 
context of Islam.   
In the following week, the New York Times ran an article called “Saudi Royals and 
Reality” which is essentially a criticism of the Arab media for its lack of coverage and criticism 
of the fact that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudis.  What is left out of this argument is 
the detail that the U.S. media essentially did the same thing, if not worse.  As has been 
mentioned above in my analysis, most of the blame was placed on the Middle East and Islam 
itself for the attacks.  So for the New York Times to come out and make the claim that Arab 
media was lacking coverage and criticism adopts the explicit-denunciation—implicit-support 
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paradigm:  It denounced the Arab media—particularly Al Jazeera—though it implicitly 
supported the concept of avoiding the Saudi origin of the hijackers, most likely due to political 
reasons.  
In the midst of my research I inadvertently came upon the International section of the 
New York Times which comes out of Brussels, Belgium. An Op-Ed was run the same day as the 
abovementioned article called “The Real Meaning of Jihad.”  The author criticized the 
mainstream media for its reductionist representations of the term jihad, without any background 
or history on the term.  The author expounds upon the two types of jihad: al-jihad al-akbar (the 
greater jihad) and al-jihad al-asghar (the lesser jihad).  The greater is considered to be an 
internal struggle, whereas the lesser jihad is more in reference to self-defense, preservation, and 
justice (Rourke, 2012, p. 15). All of the mainstream media sources that I analyzed used jihad as 
essentially synonymous with ‘Holy war.’ I have sufficiently covered the increase in the critique 
of Islam in the mainstream media, so it is necessary to move on to the next, arguably most 
blatant incorporation of the Clash of Civilizations theory. 
On November 17, 2001, Laura Bush broadcast nationally over the radio a 
commemoration of the recent attack on Afghanistan from the concept of liberating the Afghan 
woman.  For example, in one instance she says, “Only the terrorists and the Taliban threaten to 
pull out women's fingernails for wearing nail polish. The plight of women and children in 
Afghanistan is a matter of deliberate human cruelty, carried out by those who seek to intimidate 
and control.”27 In its entirety, Laura Bush’s speech was essentially a pseudo-feminist appeal to 
garner more support for the war in Afghanistan.  And abiding by the cascading activation model 
                                                          
27. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24992  
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in nearly an ideal fashion, the media immediately followed suit in its coverage of the oppressed 
Afghan woman under the rule of the Taliban. 
Time adhered strictly to the contents of Laura Bush’s speech in its coverage of the 
Afghan woman subsequent to her speech. In its December, 3, 2001, issue the concept was a 
headliner titled, “Lifting the Veil.” In the leading article, “About Face,” Afghanistan is labeled 
explicitly as being “tribal and conservative”—tribal in this instance is used as a term of 
denunciation rather than as descriptive.  The article’s focus lies on the Taliban and its policies, it 
does not mention any of the Afghan tribes present at this time. In the article’s coverage of 
different women in Afghanistan, those who show that they are content with some, or all, of their 
standards are denounced in what appears to be a deliberate manner. The author writes, “Many 
rural women, especially, claim to wear it [burka] willingly, at least when they speak in the 
presence of their husbands.”  The context here insinuates the possibility of these women not 
wanting to wear the burka, but due to the power exercised on them in this misogynistic society 
they cannot say so in the presence of men.  The article continues, “But nearly any educated 
woman you may speak to loathes the burka.”   This entire claim happens to be an anecdote, as 
well as the application of cognitive dissonance.  An example of how cognitive dissonance could 
be applied here is this: If one was to ask a woman in Afghanistan if she likes wearing her burka, 
and in private she says yes, one could claim that she is not educated because she does not ‘know’ 
that she is oppressed.  Nonetheless the article still continues to push the topic of the oppressed 
Afghan woman: [Following the previous sentence] “So do many less educated ones-if you 
question them where men cannot hear.” Another anecdote here is used, without any support from 
quotations—i.e. letting the women speak for themselves.  
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The New York Times did not take as hardline of an approach to the concept of liberating 
the ‘Afghan woman’.  There was included criticism in the November 20 edition, titled “Women 
in Afghanistan, and Here.” It argued for the positive portrayal of all Muslims in Afghanistan, as 
the author felt there was a lack of it from the NYT.  The previous day the NYT ran “Behind the 
Burka” which documented some of the stories of the liberated Afghan woman (Waldman, 2001).  
It reads, “The freedom is still too new to completely trust…but for the first time in years, women 
here say they have hope—that they will be treated like human beings, not wayward cattle.” What 
this article is able to accomplish is demonstrating how good some Afghan women feel being 
‘liberated’ by the United States, and in addition arguing for more intervention.  This, of all the 
material I found in my research, abides the closest to the Clash of Civilizations theory.  It 
embodies the micro-political framework of the second clause Huntington argued for in the 
Western defense against Islam and China: “to promote Western political values and institutions 
by pressing other societies to respect human rights as conceived in the West and adopt 
democracy on Western lines” (Huntington, 1996, p.185-6). ‘We’ are pressing Afghanistan to 
respect ‘their’ women as ‘we’ respect ‘our’ women.  Due to the fact that not all Afghan women 
liberated at this point it gives reason to push further until all are saved by the West.  The 
geopolitical framework also functions implicitly with this concept of liberation. As the West 
impresses its own values on that of an Islamic society a dichotomy is created: the West and Islam 
appear to be incompatible.   
Implications 
The media’s adopting of the Clash of Civilizations theory in its framing of Muslims and 
Islam had three overarching implications: social, intellectual, and political. The former two 
implications are mentioned in the essay “The US Media, Huntington, and September 11” by 
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Ervand Abrahamian.  These assertions I very much agree with, for they serve to encompass some 
of the most important aspects of the implications of above-analyzed media framework. However, 
Abrahamian misses a third equally important implication of the Clash of Civilizations framing, 
the political ramifications. All three of these implications are important and therefor they will all 
be addressed.   
 The social implications affected how Muslims and those that ‘looked’ Muslim were 
perceived in the American public.   As Abrahamian puts it, “By framing the crisis in the context 
of Islam it made all Muslims suspect—unless they could prove themselves innocent of being 
terrorists or sympathizing with terrorists” (2003, p. 538).  What emerged from this was a mass 
amount of Islamophobia in the United States which led to angry, discriminatory rhetoric, legal 
discrimination, and even attacks on American Muslims.  “The Reverend Jerry Falwell, the 
televangelist who claimed to speak for seventy million Christian fundamentalists, argued that he 
had studied enough to know that Muhammad, in contrast to the law-abiding Moses, was a 
‘terrorist’ who ‘indulged in violence and warfare,” writes Abrahamian.   This same kind of 
verbal assault was used by other Christian fundamentalists in the United States as well: Reverend 
Jerry Vines, Chuck Colson, Marvin Olasky, and Reverend Pat Robertson, to name a few.  Legal 
discrimination happened to be another social implication in result of the media’s framing of the 
conflict in context of Islam.  For example a New York Times article titled “Far From Attacks, a 
City Finds Peace Shattered” reads,  
“Last week, a cardiologist of East Indian descent from nearby Huntington was trying to 
go home on a bus after the airports closes, stranding him in Washington.  When the bus 
first arrived in Charleston, he found himself surrounded by police officers who ordered 
him to the ground at gunpoint.  They were responding to a panicky report from his fellow 
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passengers about the man of apparently of ‘Middle Easter descent’ carrying a black bag 
and asking about a local airport” (Toner, 2001).  
This may be only one occurrence; however, many other incidents were reported by the New York 
Times, Wall Street Journal, Time magazine, and USA Today.  Time magazine even included a 
poll of Americans that showed 67% of Americans supported an ongoing policy of interviews 
about 5000 people, ages 18-33 within the Arab-American and Islamic community [sic]—the poll 
combines both of these communities (Just a Few Questions, 2001). In the following week’s 
edition of Time an article titled, “The Taliban Next Door” was run.  The article is a narrative of 
John Walker, an American who converted to Islam, and subsequently joined the Taliban.  
Written in a chronological format, “The Taliban Next Door” focuses specifically on John 
Walker’s reading of The Autobiography of Malcolm X as a turning point, as it apparently the 
reason Walker converted.  Aside from the many allusions to the Clash of Civilizations within the 
article—“On Friday nights, though, he would change out of his Western clothes and attend 
services at the Islamic Center…John Walker had transformed himself from a quiet, smooth-
cheeked American teenager to a devout, bearded Muslim studying in Yemen”—its title and 
overarching theme  is an alarmist one.  It says: ‘Anyone you know can convert to Islam, which is 
a rite of passage to becoming a terrorist; even your own Western neighbor.’ As Abrahamian also 
notes, over 1200 Muslim immigrants were detained without habeas corpus.  The culture of fear 
within the American Muslim community also increased greatly following September 11. 28  
                                                          
28. For examples of this fear see: “Group Struggling to Shed Association with Terrorism: Narrative about a Muslim 
woman who was so scared she could not go out into public for weeks after the attacks” (September 18, NYT); 
“After Terror: Muslim Welder Files Discriminations Suit, Claims Firing Reflects Religion, Ethnicity: Story of a 
Muslim man fired by his employer, on the grounds of his religion” (Shirouzu, 2001); “Stocks Fall, with Notable 
Losses in Some Muslim Lands: Traders and investors plan to ‘sell everything Muslim after the attacks, due to 
the negative connotation with the religion” 
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 The intellectual implications were a multi-layered problem that, in some respects, was 
worse than the social.  Abrahamian writes, “Specialists who did not describe the conflict in the 
context of Islam and instead asked awkward questions were sidelined, leaving the field wide 
open to so-called experts on ‘terrorism’, ‘religious extremism’, and ‘Islamic fundamentalism.”  
An example of this rests in the review of the book Holy War, Inc. in the New York Times article 
“21st Century Jihad.”  In this review, the author gives a brief overview of the main thesis of the 
book, followed by a criticism.  Holy War, Inc. is essentially a report on the founding of the 
Taliban and Osama bin Laden.  “Bergen [author of Holy War, Inc.] has a fine eye for detail,” the 
journalist writes, “and as we accompany him over pot-hole filled paths, across chaotic boarders, 
checking out arms bazaars and listening to bin Laden’s soft cough as he proclaims Americans are 
fair game for attack, we sense we are on an interesting journey with a trustworthy guide.” Later 
in the review he writes, “He [Bergen] bursts the myth that the CIA created bin Laden, pointing 
out that the agency never had a direct relationship with him and that he was always anti-
American.”  The tone of the review changes in about the last quarter of the article becoming 
much more critical of Bergen.  The reviewer attacks a point made in the book that goes against 
what was seen as conventional wisdom in the mainstream media.  The criticism begins: 
“This book contains one significant failing, in my view, and that is Bergen’s 
analysis of why bin Laden is at war with the United States.  Bergen take issue 
with Samuel Huntington’s widely cited thesis that there is clash of civilizations 
between the West and Islam.  He says bin Laden has a clear and specific political 
agenda—changing American policy in the Middle East.  He opposes the presence 
of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the bombing of Iraq, support for Israel and 
for regimes, like those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that he considers apostates 
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from Islam.  Bin Laden has never, Bergen notes, railed against Coca-Cola or 
Madonna or homosexuals.” 
 The reviewer retorts with, “But this seems a cramped, literal parsing of bin Laden’s few 
public statements and, in the end, simplistic and unsatisfying.  You do not have to accept 
Huntington’s argument entirely to see that the battle is over more than American foreign policy.” 
Here it is clear that the reviewer accepts Huntington’s entire thesis and views the “war on terror” 
as the clash between the civilizations of the West and Islam.  Not only that, but the concept of 
bin Laden’s motives being a response to US foreign policy are denounced as being too 
simplistic; yet the reviewer seems satisfied with the Huntingtonian simplistic view of the world.   
Time and again this same sort of argumentative style was used to combat the assertions by 
dissenters that the reasoning for the attacks was deeper than the superficial concept of the Clash 
of Civilizations. 
Additionally, in accordance with Entman’s Cascading Activation Model [Image 1], two 
of the most influential academics on Huntington’s thesis served as advisors to the Bush 
administration—Francis Fukuyama and Bernard Lewis.29  This close connection demonstrates 
the reciprocal relationship in in the Cascading Activation Model between the “Administration” 
and the “Other Elites,” which in turn explains how the mainstream media was influenced to 
adopt a Clash of Civilizations framework.  Abrahamian established the social and intellectual 
implications of the media’s framing of Islam and Muslims in the context of the Clash of 
Civilizations; however, he overlooks the political. 
                                                          
29. One example of the influence of these two scholars: they both served as panelists and speakers at a 
conference titled, “Islam and the West” on Bernard Lewis’ 90th birthday 
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=200605010055
57&newsLang=en 
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To frame the September 11 attacks and subsequent ‘war on terror’ solely in the context of 
Islam and the Clash of Civilizations completely absolves the United States of any responsibility.  
The clash acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy, appearing to be inevitable.  The United States was 
not attacked for a rational political reason, rather, it was because ‘they’ hated our values and 
pluralistic society. The political implication explains why there was minimal discussion in the 
mainstream press of Palestine and Israel’s relationship, the sanctions on Iraq in the 90s, the 
bombing of Al Shifa in Sudan, the U.S. support for the mujahedeen, and many other issues 
American foreign policy had a hand in.  An example of this comes in the abovementioned quote 
of the King Abdullah’s reasoning for the September 11 attacks. 
 To reiterate the comment, Abdullah says,  
“They want to break down what America stands for. The terrorists actually want 
to provoke attacks on Arabs or Muslims in the U.S., because if the American 
communities start going after each other, if we see America fragment, then you 
destroy that special thing that America stands for.” 
 This turns the attacks into aggressive, irrational action against the United States.  There is no 
mention of other potential motives of the terrorists.  Instead, King Abdullah claims to know 
exactly what the terrorists—in this case ‘terrorist’ is directly associated with Arab and Muslim—
want to do.  The absolving the political implication accomplishment sets the tone for the 
intellectual implication.  By King Abdullah putting the conflict into the context of Islam, he adds 
to the paradigm, making it more conventional.  Thus, with each example of the interpreting of 
the ‘war on terror’ solely due to Islam the paradigm grows stronger, and more of a ‘truth’ in the 
academic sense.  Anyone who attempts to step outside that paradigm, and as Abrahamian said 
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ask ‘awkward’ questions, is not only seen as a dissident, but also less of an academic.    This 
close relationship between political and intellectual implications of the mainstream media’s 
framing of the Clash of Civilizations is present in the New York Times’ book review of Holy 
War, Inc. 
 The criticism of the book when the author says, “You do not have to accept Huntington’s 
argument entirely to see that the battle is over more than American foreign policy,” the argument 
embodies the political implication of the Clash of Civilizations framing.  Intellectually, Bergen, 
the author of Holy War, Inc. is denounced as not understanding the crisis.  But in addition, his 
argument regarding foreign policy is attacked.  Due to this attack, the idea of the Clash is 
perpetuated, while other critical arguments are denounced.  To criticize the United States’ 
foreign policy, or even bring it into question is to invite the same assault as Bergen received.  
Thus from this, the political environment becomes constrained only allowing viewpoints that 
strictly adhere to the status quo.   
 In the article “World War IV,” published on November 13, 2001 in the Wall Street 
Journal, this status quo was further solidified.  The author, Eliot A. Cohen, argues for policy 
makers and the public to focus attention on a different enemy: “The enemy in this war is not 
terrorism but militant Islam.”  In this example, the conflict is explicitly put into the context of 
Islam.  If this is true then it does not matter whether the U.S. was involved within the Middle 
East.  The problem is innate to Islam, a radical side of it, but Islam nonetheless.  Cohen continues 
his argument with advocating for “two objectives for the U.S: 1) Smashing Al Qaeda, 2) 
Teaching a lesson to governments that shelter such organizations” (2001).   The argumentative 
style of the article treats the September 11 attacks as the genesis of the problem with militant 
Islam, and the United States’ move to retaliate as a defense and preventative measure.  Once 
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again one sees a lack of historical consciousness in Cohen’s assessing of the conflict, which 
consequently allows the American government freer reign over the war in the Middle East.  
Weeks following “World War IV,” Thomas Friedman of the New York Times produced a similar 
article that adhered to the same Clash of Civilizations paradigm that has been touched on 
throughout this argument while also whitewashing the U.S. of all responsibility.  
 Friedman begins, “We’re not fighting to eradicate ‘terrorism.’  Terrorism is just a tool.  
We’re fighting to defeat an ideology: religious totalitarianism” (Friedman 2001).  This statement 
is similar to that made two weeks before by Cohen, but it has the same effect.  In two of the most 
important newspapers, which most argue are on opposite sides of the political spectrum, two 
very influential authors—Thomas Friedman is one of the most famous journalists in the world; 
Eliot A. Cohen was a strategic consultant that worked closely with the Bush Administration—
said essentially the same thing with only two weeks dividing their statements.  Unlike Cohen 
however, Friedman continues adding to his interpretation of the ‘war on terror.’  He writes, “The 
opposite of religious totalitarianism is an ideology of pluralism -- an ideology that embraces 
religious diversity and the idea that my faith can be nurtured without claiming exclusive truth.”   
Here one sees the juxtaposition between the two ‘civilizations.’  Islam is seen as home to 
‘religious totalitarianism,’ whereas the U.S. houses pluralism.  Friedman continues by explicitly 
stating this concept: “America is the Mecca of that ideology, and that is what bin Laden hates 
and that is why America had to be destroyed.”  The concept of ‘knowing’ the motives of bin 
Laden embodies the political implication.  Even if bin Laden himself was to relay a message 
claiming that the attacks on September 11 were a result of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or the 
sanctions on Iraq, or some other U.S. involvement in the Middle East, those claims would fall 
outside of the paradigm of the Clash of Civilizations set within the media.  In other words, after a 
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paradigm is solidified in the mainstream media, no one person could change that paradigm, not 
even the one who helped solidify it.   
 “Paradigms do not need to be true to become conventional wisdom,” as Abrahamian 
(2003) said.  As demonstrated above, they can be denounced, called unscientific and denounced 
in the intellectual community and still reemerge years later.  Because the mainstream American 
press media adopted the Clash of Civilizations theory in its framing of Muslims and Islam, the 
concept of taking information as is from this media system should be a thing of the past.  It is 
almost impossible to change the structure of the American media due to its immense size as well 
as the decades of ideological reinforcing.  It is up to each and every individual to discern the 
media framework at any given time, and apply skepticism and criticism when necessary.  This of 
course is not an easy task, but it happens to be necessary if one wants to obtain accurate 
information.  The world is becoming more globalized, more interconnected, more wholesome.  
Knowledge and skepticism are the only two ways to prevent this connectedness from 
fragmenting.   
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Image #1 
Cascading activation model: 
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